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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 
HATTIESBURG DIVISION 
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, in his 
private and individual capacity, on behalf 
of himself and others similarly situated 
RYAN S. WALTERS, 
MICHAEL E. SHOTWELL and 
RICHARD A. CONRAD, ET AL., on behalf 
of themselves and others similarly situated               PLAINTIFFS 
VS.         NO.2:10-cv-76 
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official 
capacity as Attorney General of the United 
States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official 
capacity as the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services; 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY; TIMOTHY F. 
GEITHNER, in his official capacity as the 
Secretary of the United States Department 
of the Treasury; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and HILDA 
L. SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary 
of the United States Department of Labor                        DEFENDANTS 
PLAINTIFF, LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT’S RESPONSE TO  
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his private and individual capacity 
(hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”), by and through his attorney of record, who separately files 
this his Response to Defendants Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General 
of the United States; the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”); 
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Kathleen Sebelius, in her official capacity as Secretary of HHS; the United States Department of 
the Treasury; Timothy F. Geithner, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Treasury; the 
United States Department of Labor; and Hilda L. Solis, in her official capacity as Secretary of 
Labor (hereinafter referred to as “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss and would respectfully show 
unto the Court the following: 
I. LT. GOV. BRYANT HAS STANDING TO BRING THE SAME 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AS THE NON-STATE EMPLOYEE 
PETITIONERS. 
 Lt. Gov. Bryant is filing this brief as a separate response to Defendants' Tenth 
Amendment arguments, which are of a different character than their other arguments due to Lt. 
Gov. Bryant's unique position as a state official who is using private party standing to bring a 
Tenth Amendment claim.  Specifically, Petitioner Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his individual capacity, 
brings an individual action and a statewide class or sub-class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
His claims allege class-wide unconstitutional activity on behalf of all Mississippi state employees 
and is particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the common claim is susceptible to a 
single proof and subject to a single injunctive.
 We wish to make clear, however, that petitioner Bryant has also joined the Amended 
Petition in his capacity as a private citizen, and as such he has the same standing to bring suit as 
the other private-party plaintiffs who originally filed this lawsuit. See Amended Petition, para. 1-
90.  In other words, should the court rule that there is no private party standing under the Tenth 
Amendment or that petitioners have failed to state a claim under the Tenth Amendment upon 
which relief can be granted, Lt. Gov. Bryant should still be allowed to proceed as a private party 
along with the other Petitioners. 
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II. LT. GOV. BRYANT HAS PLED “ENOUGH FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF THAT IS PLAUSIBLE ON ITS FACE," AND DISMISSAL IS 
THEREFORE INAPPROPRIATE. 
 A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).  
Rule 12(b) (6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  A court must not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a 
claim unless the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Sonnier v. State Farm, 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th 
Cir. 2007).   In ruling on motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court “accepts 
all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re 
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 204 (5th Cir. 2007). The reviewing court must also 
“resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the 
plaintiff.” Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). 
A. Lt. Gov. Bryant has private party standing to bring commandeering claims 
under the Tenth Amendment. 
Defendants argue that "the Tenth Amendment provides a right against commandeering, 
that right belongs to states, not to individuals."  This assertion is wholly incorrect, and 
misunderstands the fact that the Constitution consistently protects the rights of individuals, not 
the rights of states.  The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const., Amend. X. It is important to recognize that the Tenth 
Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights, the purpose of which is to protect the rights of the 
people:
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The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the 
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political 
entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the 
States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between 
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).  Since the Tenth Amendment is meant for 
the protection of individuals, it is illogical to assert that no individual may have standing to 
petition for a redress of grievances under the Tenth Amendment.  Whether the State of 
Mississippi approves of the PPACA simply does not matter - the people do not have to tolerate 
the complicity of the state and federal officials in robbing individuals of their rights:
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, 
therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be 
ratified by the "consent" of state officials. . . . The constitutional 
authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the “consent” of the 
governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether 
that unit is the Executive Branch or the States. 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 192.  Thus, the Court specifically rejected the argument 
that state governments could consent to and ratify a violation of the Tenth Amendment.  
Defendants seek to take advantage of the inaction by this state's government in order to expand 
federal power. However, because the Tenth Amendment is designed to protect individuals, Lt. 
Governor Bryant has the authority to reject the state's inaction and directly sue for a redress of 
his grievance. 
In their attempt to elevate the "rights" of states over the rights of individuals, Defendants 
cite to States v. Johnson, 652 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726 (S.D. Miss. 2009), in which this court 
rejected the proposition that the federal sex offender registration law “requir[ed] State Officials 
to administer federal law” because “a private citizen, acting on his own behalf and not in an 
official capacity or on behalf of the state citizenry, lacks standing to raise a Tenth Amendment 
claim,” citing only Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939).  
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However, the Tennessee case did not hold that a private citizen can never have standing to raise a 
Tenth Amendment claim.  Instead, the Court first held that “[t]he sale of government property in 
competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment," and in rather confusing 
dicta, the Court added, “[a]s we have seen there is no objection to the Authority's operations by 
the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no 
standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment.”  The only thing clear about this 
"holding" is that it was dicta - certainly, the Court did not plainly state that no private person can 
ever have standing under the Tenth Amendment.  Moreover, as discussed below, standing 
requirements have been considerably relaxed since Tennessee Electric Power was rendered in 
1939.
Indeed, there are quite a few decisions in which courts have upheld private party standing 
under the Tenth Amendment, including decisions that directly address the Tennessee Electric 
Power case.  For example in Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, the court faced a challenge to the 
Gun Control Act's 1996 amendments.  185 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1999).  Although the court 
eventually upheld the federal legislation, it first undertook an extensive analysis of Gillespie's 
standing to raise the claim.  Looking initially at Tennessee Electric Power, the court recognized 
that the government's argument that “any aspect of state sovereignty impinged upon by the Gun 
Control Act is one that the State, rather than an individual, must assert” had “the apparent 
support of the Supreme Court's opinion in [Tennessee Electric Power].” 185 F.3d at 700. The 
court noted, however, that standing requirements had been relaxed since the time of that case, 
and the court proceeded to examine Gillespie's standing based on modern standing requirements.  
The court next agreed that the connection between Gillespie's injury and the constitutional 
infirmity might be weak (stating "[i]t is really the State's ox being gored”), but then found that 
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any such nexus requirement had been abolished in Duke Power.  185 F.3d at 701.  Finally, the 
court addressed standing limitation that a plaintiff "'generally must assert his own legal rights 
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" 
Id. at 703 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).  On 
this point, the court looked to New York v. United States and found that the anti-commandeering 
rights Gillespie was asserting were not rights of the state, but instead were rights belonging to 
individuals. “[A]s New York explains, the Tenth Amendment, although nominally protecting 
state sovereignty, ultimately secures the rights of individuals.” As a result, the court held that 
Gillespie had standing to raise the Tenth Amendment challenge “notwithstanding what state or 
local officials themselves may have to say about the propriety of the statute.” Id. at 703-04. 
Other courts have reached the same result:  “Although the Supremacy Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment (both structural constitutional norms) directly regulate relations between 
governments rather than the relations between governments and individuals, nevertheless, 
individuals should have standing to assert constitutional protections derived from them.”  
Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529 (W.D.N.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 587 
(1987).  Other cases directly indicating that private parties have Tenth Amendment, albeit 
reluctantly, such as Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1033 n.6 (11th 
Cir. 1992) ("Because this court has said before that, if injury or threatened injury exists, private 
parties have standing to assert Tenth Amendment challenges, we conclude, with admitted doubts, 
that the Riedels and SCLA have standing to advance this Tenth Amendment claim"); Nance v. 
EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981) (assuming questionable standing to assert Tenth 
Amendment challenge); U.S. v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), 
abrogation recognized by U.S. v. Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 1999). In 
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Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, the Eleventh Circuit granted Tenth Amendment 
standing to non-governmental plaintiffs for two reasons. 666 F.2d 1359, 1369 n.16 (11th 
Cir.1982). First, “during the New Deal era the Supreme Court granted such standing by 
implication in considering the merits of the Tenth Amendment claims brought by private 
parties.” Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 637, 640 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 573, 585 (1937)). Second, the Supreme Court has expressly limited the 
nexus requirement of standing. Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 
U.S. 59 (1978)).
1
B.  The PPACA's mandate accomplishes an unconstitutional conscription of state 
officials by the federal government. 
As for the substance of commandeering claim made by Lt. Gov. Bryant, Defendants 
simply do not address it.  The Amended Petition states: 
Consequently, State employees are directly affected and 
commandeered by the PPACA, since the law necessarily 
substitutes the judgment of Congress and the Executive branches 
of the federal government for that of the employees and their 
employer, which is a State government, regarding the composition 
of health insurance plans that may be offered to and accepted or 
rejected by employees. 
Amended Petition, para. 93.  The Amended Petition thus raises the issue of whether the 
prohibition against commandeering (or "conscripting") state employees and officials extends to 
1
  In Gaubert v. Denton, 1999 WL 350103 (E.D. La. 1999), aff'd, 210 F.3d 368 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (decision without published opinion), the Eastern District of Louisiana discussed these 
cases but ultimately concluded that no right to private party standing existed, stating that "[t]he 
cases granting Tenth Amendment standing to private parties have done so without confronting 
Tennessee Electric."  However, the Gaubert court did not have the benefit of Gillespie v. City of 
Indianapolis, supra, which was rendered two months after Gaurbert.  The published circuit court 
decision in Gillespie, as discussed above, did not consider the dicta in Tennessee Electric as
dispositive but instead held that private parties do have standing under the Tenth Amendment. 
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an interference by the federal government with the terms of conditions of employment by a state 
with its workers.   
 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the boundaries of the prohibition 
against commandeering, nor has it ever explicitly delineated the limits of state sovereignty with 
regards to the terms and conditions of employment with a state.  Certainly, this is an important 
question, since the state has no shape, existence or power to act whatsoever except through its 
employees.  If Congress can interfere with the states' employer-employee relationship to the 
extent suggested by Defendants and set forth in the PPACA, then Congress will have unlimited 
power to direct the states to conform to the will of Congress, thereby making an "end run" 
around the Tenth Amendment.   
 Thus, the Court has stated that Congress may not "conscript" the State's officers directly, 
whether or not "policymaking" is involved:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to 
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that 
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the 
State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States' officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no 
case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such 
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional 
system of dual sovereignty. 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).  The Court has therefore shown that it will not 
allow the federal government to direct the work of state employees. 
 The Court has also refused to allow certain federal employment laws apply to state 
policymakers.  In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court upheld the validity of a Missouri Constitution 
provision that provided a mandatory retirement age for judges and determined that Congress’s 
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) did not apply.  501 U.S. at 473.  The Court 
held that the state constitutional provision was at the heart of the Tenth Amendment because it 
dealt directly with how states define and structure their governments. In order to avoid a conflict 
with the Tenth Amendment, the Court interpreted the ADEA as not applying to “policy-making” 
appointees such as state court judges. Id. at 460.  The Court stated that “Congressional 
interference with this decision of the people of Missouri, defining their constitutional officers, 
would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.”  Id. at 460.  The 
Court’s holding emphasized that Congress was interfering with a decision of the people of 
Missouri, not just a decision or right of the State of Missouri. According to the Court, “[i]n the 
tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”  Id. at 459. 
 The PPACA directs State of Mississippi to offer health insurance plans to its employees, 
and directs what those plans must consist of.  Congress is therefore directly ordering the States' 
officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.  Moreover, Defendants must 
acknowledge that health insurance plans are major "benefit" for employees and a major part of 
their pay.  Thus, Congress is dictating the terms and conditions of employment for state 
employees - up to and including the terms and conditions of one of the state's highest officers -- 
the Lieutenant Governor - who is thus one of the state's major policy-makers.  Congressional 
interference with employment relationship between the people of Mississippi and one of their 
chief constitutional officers has upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state 
powers.  Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra at 459-60. 
III. CONCLUSION. 
 State employees will clearly suffer a deprivation of liberty, in that they may no longer 
exercise the discretion to choose a healthcare plan that does not conform to the PPACA’s mandates 
either from their employer or on the open market.  They will no longer be able to negotiate a major 
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term of their employment contracts with the state.  Moreover, by imposing the individual mandate on 
state employees, Congress has upset the constitutionally mandated balance of power -- the 
"compound republic" guaranteed to us by the founders.  State officials like Lt. Gov. Bryant who 
completely oppose this unwarranted federal intrusion for themselves individually and because it 
represents a deprivation of liberty for all state employees will nonetheless be made to enforce this 
federal program.  Clearly, Congress has unconstitutionally interfered with the states' employment 
relationship with every state employee, including policymakers, and Lt. Governor Bryant is entitled 
to a declaratory judgment in his favor.  
Respectfully submitted this day of November 15, 2010. 
                                                                           
LT. GOVERNOR PHIL BRYANT 
By: /s/Christopher B. McDaniel            
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL
Christopher B. McDaniel, MSB #10711 
Brett W. Robinson, MSB#10006 
Roy A. Nowell, Jr., MSB#100768
HORTMAN HARLOW BASSI ROBINSON 
   & McDANIEL, PLLC 
Post Office Drawer 1409 
Laurel, MS 39441 
Tele: (601) 649-8611 
Fax: (601) 649-6062 
cmdaniel@hortmanharlow.com 
And by: /s/K. Douglas Lee
             K. DOUGLAS LEE 
K. Douglas Lee, MSB#9887
LEE LAW FIRM, LLC 
22 Milbranch Road 
Bldg., No. 100 
Hattiesburg, MS 39402 
Tele: (601) 583-4447 
Fax: (601) 450-0152 
kdl@leelaw.us
Attorneys for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been served using the 
Court’s ECF system, on Monday, November 15, 2010 to the counsel of record for all 
Defendants:
KATHRYN L. WYER 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 
20 Massachusetts Ave., NW 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
Tel. (202) 616-8475/ Fax: (202) 616-8470 
Email: Kathryn.Wyer@usdoj.gov 
Attorneys for Defendants
 Dated Monday, November 15, 2010. 
By: /s/ K. Douglas Lee 
       K. DOUGLAS LEE  
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL, MSB #10711
BRETT W. ROBINSON, MSB #10006
ROY A. NOWELL, JR., MSB #100768
HORTMAN HARLOW BASSI ROBINSON 
& McDANIEL, PLLC
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